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INTRODUCTION
The financial crash of 2008 triggered a growing critical discussion
of global capitalism and its legitimacy vis-à-vis state control and
popular interest. The definition and understanding of the latter has
been subject to intense political discussion, as evident in the current
media. 1 Advocates of neo-liberalism have begun to emphasize the
benevolent effects of the markets in a Hayekian tradition, 2 where a
trickle-down effect will lead to general distribution of income
generation. This contrasts with the Marxist approach, which
emphasizes the government’s role in redistribution and curbing
capitalism in furtherance of general societal advantage. The 2008
financial crisis highlighted the limited power individual state actors
have in influencing internationalized capitalist developments, and,
consequently, the limited sovereignty states possess vis-à-vis
globalized finance. As a result, the market-based democratic state,
through its government, finds itself caught between conflicting
demands: acting on behalf of the electorate as its legitimator of
power, while adhering to the principles of globalized capitalism with
its demand for competitiveness and economic opportunity. Growing
political backlash has exposed this tension over the last few years,
1. See, e.g., Branko Milanovic, The Higher the Inequality, the More Likely We
to Move Away from Democracy, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/may/02/higher-inequality-move-awayfrom-democracy-branko-milanovic-big-data [https://perma.cc/R6WD-864G]; George
Robinson, Piketty’s Puzzle: Globalization, Inequality and Democracy, GLOBAL
POL’Y
J.
(Dec.
9,
2015),
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/12/2015/piketty%E2%80%99s-puzzleglobalization-inequality-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/AE87-VUVB].
2. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER
(1948).
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against the backdrop of populist politicians decrying loss of political
control vis-à-vis globalization and a wider popular stake in the
proceeds of global capital gains.
Almost forty years of predominant neo-liberal discourse in the
context of globalization resulted in a shift in the perceived relative
values of, and relationship between, individual and collective
interests. 3 This has had the effect of pitting independently acting,
opportunity-chasing metropolitan centers against the broader
collectives represented by the democratic state. Rather than feeling
confined to the horizons staked out by their respective state
territories, cities are now increasingly defining their ambitions, and
likely their opportunities, through their functional and political
interrelations within specific interest-based, self-organizing,
collaborative networks. 4 Simply being content with what is available
in a particular territory no longer suffices for cities reaching outward.
Inequality, metropolitanism, and elitism have become closely
associated in recent populist, nationalist rhetoric, which attacks
globalization and multilateralism as not being in the interest of
“the People.” Nationalist sentiment has risen as part of that rhetoric,
as evidenced by the ascendance of starkly right-wing parties across
Europe. 5 The election of Donald Trump as United States (U.S.)
president, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the new
populist “anti-establishment” Italian government 6 are examples of an
anti-globalist and anti-metropolitan backlash by those feeling
resentful of being “left behind” – a term frequently used in the press
and public debate 7—as the rewards of economic globalization appear
to reach some more than others. 8
3. PAUL HOPPER, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES IN AN AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 13–
27 (2017).
4. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES 19 (2016); see also
PETER J. TAYLOR & BEN DERUDDER, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN
ANALYSIS 179–93 (2015).
5. The meaning of “people” is rather diffuse, used in various politically charged
ways by populist political parties who like to present themselves as the democratic
voice of those very “people.” See, e.g., David Molloy, What Is Populism, and What
Does the Term Actually Mean?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43301423 [https://perma.cc/99YT-QR2K].
6. Italy Government: Giuseppe Conte to Head Populist Coalition, BBC NEWS
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44322429
[https://perma.cc/JEM2-K88N]; see also Jacopo Brigazzi, New Italian PM Is Proud to
Be Populist, POLITICO (July 6, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/new-italianprime-minister-giuseppe-conte-is-proud-to-be-populist/
[https://perma.cc/8PDUKPSU].
7. For discussions of the “left behinds” by globalization, see, e.g., Left in the
Lurch: Globalisation Has Marginalized Many Regions in the Rich World,
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Although much of this resentment is economically driven, it also
reflects a sense of loss of democratic voice in political decisionmaking. This appeal for voice becomes expressed in support for
individual political parties, and, more broadly, for a representative
democracy through participation in elections. 9 Questions abound
over the functioning of representative democracy and its ideal of
As economic
egalitarian representation of the populace. 10
experiences are linked to the principles of liberal democracy, support
for liberal democracy may be waning with shrinking economic
rewards. The populists express what a growing number of people
may have thought since the austerity politics after the 2008 financial
crash 11: Does democracy work for me? Will the promised trickledown effect materialize for me? 12
The issue concerns a central organizational principle: networkbased, metropolitan interests, or territorially bounded state interests?
States now can allow cities to shine globally, to make the most out of
their visibility and appeal — on the understanding that the rest of the
state will also benefit further down the line as a trickle-down effect.
Alternatively, states may seek to maintain (or increase) the
cohesiveness of their respective territories and insist on treating the
cities as just one part of the municipal tier of administration at the
sub-national level, firmly integrated into the administrative and
political hierarchy.
This Article addresses the conundrum of an increasingly apparent
mismatch between two geographic entities — those economically and

ECONOMIST
(Oct.
21,
2017),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/10/21/globalisation-has-marginalised-manyregions-in-the-rich-world [https://perma.cc/73Q9-5T4E].
8. Globalization Benefits Everyone, but Gains Unevenly Distributed: Study,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 8, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/globalization-benefitseveryone-but-gains-unevenly-distributed-study/a-44122842 [https://perma.cc/BM5U8U8S].
9. See Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political
Engagement, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 48–60 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Sagar Sanyal, A Defense of Democratic Egalitarianism, 109 J. PHIL.
413, 413–34 (2012). For more concerned with democratic theory, see generally
THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2018).
11. On “austerity politics,” see, e.g., Wendy Broen, Sacrificial Citizenship:
Neoliberalism, Human Capital and Austerity Politics, 23 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 3–14
(2016).
12. Alex Andreou, Opinion, Trickle-Down Economics Is the Greatest Broken
Promise
of
Our
Lifetime,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
20,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/trickle-down-economicsbroken-promise-richest-85 [https://perma.cc/9EUH-8DDB].

2018]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1201

those politically driven. The former is a mere virtual backcloth to a
network of hubs (here, the cities) and spokes (the economic and
political relations), while the latter is a contiguous territory defined by
circumfusing boundaries. The economically driven geographic entity
involves growing territorial variations in economic opportunities,
whereas politically defined territoriality draws on the egalitarian
principle of democratic representation in a liberal democracy. The
Article examines the challenges arising from the growing mismatch
between the two geographies for democratic governments, with cities
suggested as crucial connectors between the two. Specifically, this
Article will use the case study of the Danish-Swedish Øresund Region
to highlight the interaction between the international sphere, and the
state, region, and city levels, as they compete in a globalized
economy. The examination of this case study will accentuate this
Article’s main argument that the central role of metropolitan areas
and larger cities is to function as connectors between the two
geographies — the collaborative, network-based and the territorially
defined. Metropolitan regions, in particular, function as the primary
foci of national competitiveness in a globalized economy. Yet, they
also act out of self-interest, not merely as agents of the state or region.
This puts them at the forefront of political criticism — for placing
self-interest above the collective interests of the nation or region.
Metropolitan areas are thus experiencing growing popular political
pressure to reconcile economic self-interest and political belonging to
a larger entity – the nation or region.
This Article argues that linking formal territoriality with informal
spatiality may generate synergy effects. In other words, it means to
connect (1) the pre-defined formal territorial organization and
distribution of state power, resources, and democratic legitimacy for
action, and (2) more fragmented informal spaces loosely and
temporarily circumscribed by self-organizing and selective networks
of like-interested actors (e.g., the cities). This includes the dynamics
and responsiveness of more ad hoc-forming, interest-based
collaborative groupings and networks. Scope for, and interest in, such
integration, however, varies.
This Article is divided into three main parts. Part I discusses the
growing gap between political and economic spaces as a result of the
way in which competitiveness has pushed for the fragmentation of
economic spaces within states and regions — and its implications for
democratic legitimacy and sense of mattering among the electorate.
Part II takes a closer look at metropolitan areas as primary actors, as
well as indicators of the growing discrepancy between economic and
political geographies within a state territory. The focus is on the role
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of metropolitan areas and cities not only in driving competitiveness,
and thus individualism, but also in functioning as connectors and
agents of state-territorial cohesiveness to avoid political
fragmentation and alienation. Part III is divided into two parts.
Section III.A looks at the example of the international Øresund
Region between Denmark and Sweden to illustrate the processes and
tensions discussed in Parts I and II. Section III.B teases out possible
avenues for resolving the conundrum between individualism-driving
economic competitiveness and the collective, egalitarian ambitions of
representative democracy.
I. METROPOLITANISM AND THE “REST”: DEMOCRATIC
CHALLENGES FOR THE TERRITORIAL STATE
This Part discusses the growing fragmentation of the territorially
based democratic common — frequently, the state — through
competitive action by cities in response to neo-liberal globalized
capitalism. These fragmentations challenge established notions and
practices of representative democracy, with its underlying egalitarian
principles in getting one’s voice heard in political decisions. A
growing division between cities and metropolitan regions, as most
likely competitive “winners” and the less successful “rest,” raises
questions about the fragmenting and, ultimately potentially
hollowing-out, effect of neo-liberal capitalism.
Section I.A discusses the ways in which a rising “metropolitanism”
challenges the territorially defined and expressed “state as shared
common.” Section I.B focuses on economic competitiveness as a
challenger to established public policies, especially in Western
Europe, to counteract inequalities and thus promote territorial and
societal cohesiveness of the democratic state. Finally, Section I.C
looks more specifically at the fragmenting effect of growing
competitive individualism, and the impact of such on interest
representation in a representative democracy.
A. Metropolitan Individualism, Competitiveness, and the
Fragmentation of the Democratic Common
This section looks at the interaction between “metropolitan-ness”
and competitiveness, and the resulting elitism, as it questions the
principle of democratic egality within a given territory.
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“Metropolitan” has become a contested and politically charged
term, 13 insinuating not only elitism and superior opportunities, but
also political and economic arrogance, vis-à-vis the respective wider
region and nation-state. The rise in populist anti-metropolitan
sentiment is an expression of the underlying, simmering discontent
and anger about a deepening economic divide between many
metropolitan “winners” and a lot of non-metropolitan “losers” of
neo-liberal globalization. These gaps reflect different degrees of
engagement with “global flows” of capitalism and the dynamics in
creating or removing income opportunities with them. 14 This sense of
a shift towards more elitism may create a feeling of losing control and
relevance, which may lead to estrangement and alienation —
something referred to by those feeling pushed into such a passive role
as “being left behind.” 15 Differential development results from
differences in capacity to utilize the effects of globalization to
individual advantage, which is notable on several levels: first, at the
global level, between developed and developing countries, with the
latter blaming the former for unfair practices and structures that put
them at an inherent disadvantage 16; second, at the regional level,
between clusters of countries, such as the European Union (EU),
where the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis pitted the North
against the South 17; and third, at the national level, between the
successful metropolitan regions and the mostly non-urban, peripheral
“rest” of the state, 18 or between struggling old industrial towns or
cities that seem to have lost their economic raisons d’être. 19

13. See, e.g., Eliane Glaser, In Defence of the Metropolitan Elite,
(Oct.
20,
2016),
NEWSTATESMAN
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/10/defence-metropolitan-elite
[https://perma.cc/S5S9-8RC6].
14. See generally Manuel Castells, Globalisation, Networking, Urbanisation:
Reflections on the Spatial Dynamics of the Information Age, 47 URB. STUD. 2737,
2737–45 (2010).
15. Michael Cox, The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit,
Trump and Beyond, 28 IRISH STUD. INT’L AFF. 9, 9–17 (2017).
16. Axel Dreher & Noel Gaston, Has Globalization Increased Inequality?, 16
REV. INT’L ECON. 516, 516–36 (2008). On North-South differences, see, e.g., JeanPhilippe Therien, Beyond the North-South Divide: The Two Tales of World Poverty,
20 THIRD WORLD Q. 723, 723–42 (1999).
17. Peter A. Hall, The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis, 21 GERMAN
POL. 355, 355–71 (2012).
18. Larry S. Bourne & Jim Simmons, New Fault Lines? Recent Trends in the
Canadian Urban System and Their Implications for Planning and Public Policy,
CANADIAN J. URB. RES. 22, 22–47; see also generally Roberta Capella & Ugo Fratesi,

Scenarios for European Metropolitan Regions: Winners and Losers in a Globalized
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Competitiveness, a second factor discussed here, defines spaces of
economic opportunity. Unlike state territories, these spaces are
largely virtual, circumscribed by networks of cities that pursue their
individual metropolitan interests as centers of economic activity and
competitiveness. The Core Cities network of the ten largest English
cities is one example. 20 They are highly selective in who is included in
their networks, and who is not, to maximize the advantages of
collective engagement for the existing network members. This
contrasts with conventional state territory as a geographic
jurisdictional “container,” 21 clearly defined by administrative borders
within which all citizens are subject to the same provisions. That is
where the tension arises: While all are equally part of jurisdictional
territories, only a select number qualify for inclusion in the
fragmented metropolitan-centric network spaces of enhanced
competitive opportunity.
The inherent variability of relationally defined spaces offers the
opportunity to find, and poses the requirement of finding, appropriate
responses to quickly changing economic conditions and prospects.
Equipped with the attribute “new,” 22 these spaces have increasingly
become associated with less formalized alliances around actor
networks, 23 built around shared policy objectives at a particular
time, 24 and “interactive effects” on regional development. 25 Space in

World, in METROPOLITAN REGIONS: KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURES

OF THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY 195, 195–233 (Johan Klaesson et al. eds., 2013).
19. Catherine Thorleifsson, From Coal to Ukip: The Struggle over Identity in
Post-Industrial Doncaster, 27 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 555, 555–68 (2016).
20. For more detail on city networks, see, e.g., TASSILO HERRSCHEL & PETER
NEWMAN, CITIES AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: URBAN AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
BEYOND THE NATION STATE 76–92 (2017).
21. On the notion of “spatial containers,” see, e.g., John Agnew, The Territorial
Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory, 1 REV.
INT’L POL. ECON. 53, 53–80 (1994); see also Martin Boisen et al., The Selective
Nature of Place Branding and the Layering of Spatial Identities, 4 J. PLACE MGMT. &
DEV. 135, 135–47 (2011).
22. See generally Fredrik Söderbaum & Timothy Shaw, Conclusion: What
Futures for New Regionalism?, in THEORIES OF NEW REGIONALISM: A PALGRAVE
READER (Fredrik Söderbaum & Timothy Shaw eds., 2003); see also Gordon
MacLeod & Mark Goodwin, Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and
Regional Governance, 23 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 503, 503–27 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Andrea Whittle & Andre Spicer, Is Actor Network Theory
Critique?, 29 ORG. STUD. 612, 614 (2008); Jonathan Murdoch, The Spaces of ActorNetwork Theory, 29 GEOFORUM 357, 357 (1998).
24. See generally TASSILO HERRSCHEL, CITIES, STATE AND GLOBALISATION:
CITY-REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 1–13 (2014).
25. Neil M. Coe et al., ‘Globalizing’ Regional Development: A Global Production
Networks Perspective, 29 TRANSACTIONS INST. BR. GEOGRAPHERS 468, 469 (2004).
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itself needs to be understood as a “system of relations,” 26 rather than
an a priori defined geographic entity 27 potentially offering a
territorial trap for political analysis.28 It is increasingly important to
understand inter-actor connections and relations in their reach across
spatial scales and administrative boundaries. 29
Yet, the reality is that there is a growing divide between some
metropolitan “winners” with trendy, globalized lifestyles and
international outlook, and other metropolitan areas, especially those
having undergone major structural economic changes. Detroit, for
instance, has become almost symbolic of the latter. Such selectivity of
opportunity may be viewed as the result and expression of favoritism
and elitist arrogance from those outside the metropolitan microcosms.
From the perspective of these outsiders, the advantages of
globalization seem less obvious. It is here that the democratic state
common becomes fragmented into areas of favoritism and uneven
“voice” across varying parts of society.
This discontent suggests that, so far, there has been little success in
“matching up” the shifting, increasingly fluid, and highly selective
geographies of variegated economic prospects and successes with
existing, static, and formally institutionalized state territories. As a
result, despite being part of the same territory (e.g., state, region,
city), there may exist quite considerable differences in de facto
representation of interests at the political level. This fundamentally
contradicts the principle of a Western representative popular
democracy, 30 where “one man—one vote” applies as a necessary
condition and is the foundation of the legitimacy of the democratic
state’s territorial and institutional structures and powers. 31

26. DAVID HARVEY, EXPLANATION IN GEOGRAPHY 192 (1969).
27. See generally TASSILO HERRSCHEL & PETER NEWMAN, THE GOVERNANCE OF
EUROPE’S CITY REGIONS: PLANNING, POLICY, AND POLITICS (2002).
28. See generally Agnew, supra note 21.
29. MICHAEL KEATING, THE NEW REGIONALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE:
TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING AND POLITICAL CHANGE 82–110 (Edward Elgar ed.,
1998).
30. See generally NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES
AND GENEALOGY (2006).
31. STEPHEN J. PURDEY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE GROWTH PARADIGM 56 (2010).
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B. Competitive Territorial Individualism Versus the Cohesive
Democratic State
The interaction between state-territorial structure and agendadriven network spaces is shaped by the degree of congruence between
the two. 32 Less congruence suggests greater emphasis on individualist
interests pursued through networks. Greater congruence suggests two
scenarios: either a less intensely individualistic push for greater
competitive advantage, or a stronger presence of state structures that
could facilitate closer integration with metropolitan initiatives, such as
international engagement and marketing. In the latter instances,
cities’ individual ambitions remain embedded in their wider regional
and national contexts to produce complementary synergy effects, as
opposed to producing a growing fragmentation and individualization
that deepens the divide between perceived winners and losers.
Structure allows a clear identification between inclusion and
exclusion of actors and places, based on pre-defined goals, principles,
and modi operandi, all within clearly defined boundaries. Such clarity
is more difficult to achieve for “relations,” as these are inherently
variable, less visible and predictable, and highly selective.
Consequently, the forms and extent of inclusions and exclusions vary.
The geographic ramifications of this complex and potentially
conflictual interrelationship circumscribe the scope for individual
actors — citizens, places, and administrations — to gain
representation of their own interests at the policy-making level. This
concept applies across scale, to the position of cities within state
territories and increasingly dominant nodes of economic and political
decision-making, and affects the state as a whole. These network
relations are both outcomes and originators of a place-focused and
place-shaped way of linking relevant political, social, and economic
variables, as structure shapes agency and vice versa. In geographic
terms, virtual “spaces” are no more than mere spatial backcloths
underlying urban-centric networks. They are merely illustrative or
discursively projected. Yet, through their characteristics and qualities,
they may also act as descriptors of forces shaping such structures.
The selective nature of actor networks means that being part of such
a circle suggests increased relevance as actors. Relational relevance is
thus becoming more important in shaping agendas than simply being
included based on location on this side or the other of a territorial
boundary, be that geographically, institutionally, or organizationally.

32. See generally NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND
THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (2004).
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Thus, the territorial state essentially presumes the static-ness of
boundaries and defined territories of responsibility, accountability,
power, and legitimacy.
Meanwhile, self-organizing networks are variably connected and
interactive. They reach both vertically and horizontally across that
fixed, formalized arrangement of the state. The result is inevitably a
number of gaps and cleavages within and across geographic scales. 33
And it is the ability to bridge these gaps and cleavages that
determines the efficacy and legitimacy of resulting collaborative
action and decision-making.
C. Inequality Under Fragmented Spatial Opportunism?
Almost twenty years ago, regions, rather than nation-states, 34 were
the main focus of attempts at raising national competitiveness; they
were understood to be the most effective geographic “unit” for
framing responses to the challenges of ever-expanding globalization.
The rise of economic competitiveness is widely understood as being
attractive to capital investment 35 and has near doctrinal status in
public policy, meaning that challenges to it result in accusations of
pursuing socialism. 36 This debate, especially since the collapse of the
communist world post-1989, means that the state per se has become
associated with cumbersome, too-unresponsive, and bureaucratic
policy-making that inhibits capital investment and growth. Rescaling
the state was one answer, but policy-making as such had to change as
well. 37 Opportunity-focused collaborations, informal and temporal,
appeared better suited to the more differentiated post-”Fordist”
economy, where small-batch production and market responsiveness,

33. See Arjen Boin & Paul T. Hart, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission
Impossible?, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 544, 545 (2003); see generally Mario Telò,
Introduction: Globalization, New Regionalism and the Role of the European Union,

to EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW REGIONALISM (Mario Telo ed., 3d ed. 2016).
34. See generally Philip Cooke & Gerd Schienstock, Structural Competitiveness
and Learning Regions, 1 ENTERPRISE & INNOVATION MGMT. STUD. 265 (2000).
35. Roberto Camagni, On the Concept of Territorial Competitiveness: Sound or
Misleading?, 39 URB. STUD. 2395, 2395–2411 (2002).
36. See, e.g., Michael McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism:
Reps. Louie Gohmert, Steve King Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmertsteve-king_n_1383973.html [https://perma.cc/7CNP-FHPV].
37. See generally BRENNER, supra note 32.
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and just-in-time principles, have become predominant in shaping
increasingly individualized and differentiated economics. 38
Scholars are concerned with closing the gap between rigid state
administrative structures and economically required variability and
flexibility. On the one hand, retaining structure avoids “a failure of
traditional mechanisms” in effectively allocating resources. 39 Should
the necessary flexibility, then, be introduced through collaborative or
associative forms of governance, 40 collective action, 41 or collaborative
institutionalism? 42 One conventional response has been repeated
reorganization of the state. 43 This is ultimately futile, given
organizational and popular resistance to moving administrative
boundaries and places. 44 Instead, existing governmental structures
may be given the necessary dynamics by linking established structures
to relational arrangements 45 and thus effectively creating state
structures that are relationally as well as territorially defined. This
anchoring of the virtual, opportunity-driven, urban-centric network to
the jurisdictional territory of the democratic state is the crux of
reconciling the inherent elitism of the former 46 with the presumed

38. Bob Jessop, Post-Fordism and the State, in COMPARATIVE WELFARE SYSTEMS
165–80 (Bent Greve ed., 1996).
39. Simon Zadek, Global Collaborative Governance: There Is No Alternative, 8
CORP. GOVERNANCE 374, 385 (2008).
40. Nicholas A. Phelps & Mark Tewdwr-Jones, Scratching the Surface of

Collaborative and Associative Governance: Identifying the Diversity of Social Action
in Institutional Capacity Building, 32 ENV’T & PLAN. A 111, 111–30 (2000).
41. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (2015); see also Elinor
Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 551 (2010).
42. Patsy Healey, Building Institutional Capacity Through Collaborative
Approaches to Urban Planning, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. A 1531, 1531–46 (1998).
43. Neil Brenner, Open Questions on State Rescaling, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS
ECON. & SOC’Y 123, 123–39.
44. See generally Kaj Zimmerbauer & Anssi Paasi, When Old and New

Regionalism Collide: Deinstitutionalization of Regions and Resistance Identity in
Municipality Amalgamations, 30 J. RURAL STUD. 31 (2013).
45. See discussion infra Sections II.C, II.E; see generally Colin Flint et al.,
Conceptualizing Conflict Space: Toward a Geography of Relational Power and
Embeddedness in the Analysis of Interstate Conflict, 99 ANNALS ASS’N AM.

GEOGRAPHERS 827 (2009).
46. See, e.g., ROBERT AGRANOFF & MICHAEL MCGUIRE, COLLABORATIVE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2004); see
generally Terry L. Cooper et al., Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public
Management, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 76 (2006); Michael McGuire, Collaborative
Public Management: Assessing What We Know and How We Know It, 66 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 33 (2006); Rosemary O’Leary & Nidhi Vij, Collaborative Public
Management: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going?, 42 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 507 (2012).
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egalitarian political representativeness of the latter. There is some
unease in this respect, given the generally less transparent decisionmaking structures in collaborative networks, compared to the clear
role given to citizens in hierarchical state administration structures. 47
For instance, elitism becomes evident in the correlation between
degree of political recognition and socioeconomic status and success
when it comes to policy goals and agendas. 48 It is this unevenness in
“voice,” whether actual or perceived, that questions a defining feature
of democracy: egality among all groups and persons in society. This
promise of isonomia to the whole electorate — the demos 49 — is the
primary rationale for the acceptance and functioning of
representative democracy 50 (i.e. the acceptance of the same standing
in front of the law for all members of society). Claims of one law for
the rich and another for the poor suggest that the perception at least
does not quite reflect that democratic ideal.
And this perception affects the legitimacy and appropriateness of
policies and political decisions that derive from any such perceived
selective consideration of interest, especially as such decisions seem
to be influenced by outside factors.
The populist, “antiestablishment” and “anti-metropolitan elite” backlash we are
currently seeing in many Western democracies attests to that. 51 This
quite clearly exposes the conundrum between pushing for greater
economic competitiveness, which mostly means a focus on urban
areas, and the notion of egalitarian democratic representation of all,
irrespective of their position in the state territory. It is this very
egalitarianism in having a voice that provides legitimacy for derived
political action. The absence of such egalitarianism, by contrast, may
imply the absence of legitimacy, as suggested by the new populist
Right. 52

47. See JAMES BOHMAN, Representation in the Deliberative System, in
DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT THE LARGE SCALE 77, 77–
92 (John Parkinson & Jane Mansbridge eds., 2012); Nadia Urbinati, Representation
as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation, 28 POL. THEORY 758, 758–86
(2000).
48. See generally Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in
the American States, 40 AM. POL. RES. 29 (2011).
49. On the changing position of demos, see generally WENDY BROWN, UNDOING
THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION (2015).
50. See generally URBINATI, supra note 30.
51. See generally WILLIAM GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT
TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018).
52. See, e.g., SIMON BORNSCHIER, CLEAVAGE POLITICS AND THE POPULIST RIGHT:
THE NEW CULTURAL CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE 1–7 (2010); see also Elisabeth
Ivarsflaten, What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining
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Part I laid out the central premise of this Article: There exists a
growing push for urban individualism under the pressures of
competitive globalized capitalism. The weakening of the state as a key
actor in structural economic policy has resulted in a growing “cities
first” mentality. Part II will examine established views of the
territorial state as a cohesive economic entity, underpinned by
relevant collective policies.
II: COMPETITIVE URBAN INDIVIDUALISM VIS-À-VIS COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
This Part explores both the evidence and consequences of a
growing gap between the conventional state-territorial perspective
behind democratic representation, and the role of cities as arenas of
democratic processes and actors in their own right.
The discussion is divided into five sections. Section II.A examines
the growing neo-liberalization of established structural economic
policies, and thus the acceptance of inequality instead of something to
be counteracted by the state. Section II.B links this growing
individualization to the role and position of cities as competitive
actors vis-à-vis the territorial democratic state with its underlying
notion of egality. Section II.C looks at the growing role of informal
collaborative action between cities to pursue their specific interests en
face of the nation-state and its institutionalized politics for all its
territory. Section II.D further discusses cities as a growing elite within
state territories, and the resulting divisions between those localities
participating and those not. Finally, Section II.E addresses questions
of “citi-ness” in democracy: the need to consider the particular role of
urban elements in democratic processes, and the role of cities in
connecting local competitive individualism and collectivism of the
state.
A. The Urban and the Neo-Liberal State and the Acceptance of
Regional Inequality
This section discusses the effect of the rise of neo-liberalism as
political agenda in the 1990s at the expense of established social
democratic social market economies, such as in post-war Western
Europe. State involvement, through government regulation, in
making the market economy deliver more equitable outcomes within
national economies in Western Europe, has been an important part of
Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 3, 3
(2008).
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the “[p]ost[-]war social contract” between state, capital, and society.53
Instead, as captured by Fukuyama’s “End of History” 54 claim, in the
face of the collapse of communism, state involvement in capitalism
was considered counterproductive because it was seen as too socialist.
This, together with Britain’s push for greater liberalization of the
European Common Market under the then Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, 55 moved EU economic policy closer to a competitive free
market agenda.
The nation-state, with its complex administration and interests,
seemed ill-suited to effectively address the rapidly changing
challenges and opportunities produced by globalization. And so, in
Europe, the concept of a “Europe of the Regions,” rather than
nations, 56 was advocated by the European Commission as a new
future framework for international relations.
The result has been a substantial shift in the EU’s Regional
Policy 57 towards a much more urban-centric and competitivenessoriented approach, illustrating the changing focus of politics.
Implicitly, inequalities were now accepted as a given. Rather than the
state trying to incentivize private capital investment to consider lessthan-ideally-competitive locations outside metropolitan areas, the
greater appeal of urban areas is accepted. Their prospects in a
globalized market are to be strengthened as the strongest national
players, to then benefit the rest of the state territory following the
neo-liberal trickle-down rationale. 58

53. See, e.g., Leonard Schoppa, Globalization and the Squeeze on the Middle
Class: Does Any Version of the Postwar Social Contract Meet the Challenge?, in

SOCIAL CONTRACTS UNDER STRESS: THE MIDDLE CLASSES OF AMERICA, EUROPE,
AND JAPAN AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 319–20 (Olivier Zunz et al. eds., 2002).
54. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST
MAN (1992).
55. See James Ball, The Thatcher Effect: What Changed and What Stayed the
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
12,
2013),
Same,
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/12/thatcher-britain
[https://perma.cc/JE8M-EWYJ]; Christoph Hermann, Neoliberalism in the European
Union, 79 STUD. POL. ECON. 61, 75–76 (2007).
56. See generally John Loughlin, “Europe of the Regions” and the Federalization
of Europe, 26 PUBLIUS 141 (1996).
57. See Roberto Camagni & Roberta Capello, Macroeconomic and Territorial
Policies for Regional Competitiveness: An EU Perspective, 2 REGIONAL SCI. POL’Y
& PRAC. 1, 10 (2010) (“‘[I]ntegrated spatial/urban development policies’ were
recently indicated by . . . the EU . . . as the consistent new policy approach . . . .”).
58. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth
and Development, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 152 (1997) (discussing theory that
wealth trickles down “from the rich to the poor” and “leads to a unique steady-state
distribution of wealth” if capital accumulation is high).
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The EU’s URBAN program of the late 1990s, and now
URBACT, 59 is a good example of the shift from traditional
territorially-based redistributive state policies towards selective
support of cities as best horses in the competitive race for capital
investment. 60 Now, in the face of a growing anti-globalist right-wing
nationalism in Europe, there is a tentative rediscovery of the virtues
of the traditional leitbild of EU-wide cohesion in quality of life and
opportunity as the embodiment of national and European collective
interest and community. 61 Thus, while regions as a territorial whole
have remained the primary unit of geographic reference for publicly
declared policies, the growing debates on globalization have
narrowed the focus on metropolitan centers of de facto policies. 62
Since this shift in perspective, the EU has been trying to square the
circle between promoting cohesion across its territory as an integral
part of its founding principles, 63 while also following the essentially
Anglo-Saxon model of neo-liberal, globalized competitiveness with its
focus on individual achievement. And here, the cities and
metropolitan areas have emerged as best positioned. 64 As a result,
state territory outside these centers has lost its predominant position
in the EU’s structural spatial policy agenda. 65 In effect, there has
been a negative trickle down. 66

59. The EU set up URBACT about fifteen years ago to “enable cities to work
together and develop integrated solutions to common urban challenges . . . .”
URBACT
at
a
Glance,
URBACT,
www.urbact.eu/urbact-glance
[https://perma.cc/956N-BWGZ].
60. Rob Atkinson, The Emerging ‘Urban Agenda’ and the European Spatial
Development Perspective: Towards an EU Urban Policy?, 9 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 385,
386–88 (2001).
61. See, e.g., Susan S. Fainstein, Competitiveness, Cohesion, and Governance:
Their Implications for Social Justice, 25 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 884, 885
(2001) (citing Amsterdam as an example of where there is “practicable possibility”
that “economic growth and social cohesion can go hand in hand”).
62. See Castells, supra note 14, at 2743–44 (discussing contradiction between
“strong regional or local identity” and concentration of “wealth, power and
innovation” in metropolitan “mega nodes” that lack “institutional existence”).
63. See Fainstein, supra note 61, at 887 (“The continued existence of the
European national welfare states in the face of ideological assaults on their viability
demonstrates the possibility of retaining social benefits even within the context of
heightened global competition.”).
64. See Ioannis Chorianopoulos & Theodoros Iosifides, The Neoliberal

Framework of EU Urban Policy in Action: Supporting Competitiveness and Reaping
Disparities, 21 LOC. ECON. 409, 419 (2006) (“The neoliberal conceptualisation of EU

urban policy is based on the belief that ‘harmonious development’ is the result of
enhanced ‘competitiveness.’”).
65. See Michael Kitson et al., Regional Competitiveness: An Elusive yet Key
Concept?, 38 REGIONAL STUD. 991, 996–97 (2004) (discussing “issue of whether and
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It is a typical neo-liberal narrative, where the betterment of the
strong is justified by the expected eventual trickle-down effect to the
rest. 67 But such filtering down requires the willingness of the
“winners” to let go at least some of their proceeds to the benefit of
the wider common. This would mean that cities needed to be put
back in their places as integral parts of the state territorial geographic
and political fabric. But that deprives them of the opportunity of
becoming more visibly global and playing their best sides to the
audience. This expected — and advocated — trickle down has not
materialized everywhere as promised. Much of it has remained
confined to metropolitan areas, rather than fanning out into the more
peripheral areas. There, this selective effect leads to the recalibration
of the respective communal space as a reflection of the delicate
balancing act between competitive standing and being an integral part
of a state territory. As it has turned out, the gap between “winners
take all” and the “losers” of this head-on competitiveness has never
been wider across the world. 68 And it is the resulting disaffection,
frustration, and anger that have supported a new nationalist,
protectionist and anti-globalist, populist agenda across the Western
world.
Discussions about global cities 69 and their pivotal role in the new
“network society,” 70 where network relations are the basis of a
society and not so much shared territory and physical proximity,
reflect the dominant narratives at this time. Large, internationally

how far policy should focus on particular localities within the region rather than on
others” and European Commission’s recognition of the need for “reduc[ing] of
spatial socio-economic inequalities”).
66. See Richard P.F. Holt & Daphne T. Greenwood, Negative Trickle-Down and
the Financial Crisis of 2008, 46 J. ECON. ISSUES 363, 363–64 (2012) (defining
“negative trickle-down” as the flow of economic growth “increasingly to the very
top,” accompanied by “negative externalities that diminish financial well-being”).
67. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 58, at 151 (describing trickle-down as a
“widely believed” theory).
68. Robert Hunter Wade, Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?, 34
INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 381, 403–04 (2004) (presenting studies suggesting “world
income inequality has been rising during the past two to three decades” and
challenging World Bank’s poverty numbers); see also Micaela di Leonardo, New
Global and American Landscapes of Inequality, in NEW LANDSCAPES OF
INEQUALITY: NEOLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3–4
(Jane L. Collins et al. eds., 2008) (highlighting “proliferating array of markers of
human misery” amid “the rise of neoliberal globalization”).
69. See generally Saskia Sassen, Whose City Is It? Globalization and the
Formation of New Claims, 8 PUB. CULTURE 205 (1996).
70. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, in THE INFORMATION AGE:
ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (2d ed. 2009).
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operating cities 71 have thus increasingly moved to the center ground
politically and economically. These cities have been encouraged by
national governments to do so, 72 in the quest for greater economic
success for the whole of the wider region and state as the expected
outcome.
The Europe-wide Eurocities network 73 is one such “elite”
international project by leading European cities to raise their profile
and emancipate themselves from their respective nation-states as
“masters.” This involved less institutionalized, and thus less binding,
forms of collaborative regionalism, driven by opportunistic
considerations by each collaborator. 74 However, such self-selection
processes mean that not all urban players or other spatial entities, are
equal in their scope and capacity to engage, or being invited to
engage, by others. The reason is that they may not have to offer the
qualities sought, and thus advantages available, that promise win-win
outcomes for all those actors engaged in a network. But that matters
as the primary appeal of building and joining a self-selecting policy
network, where collaboration is to bring more advantages to each
participant than “going it alone.” So, the strong will seek the strong,
thus reinforcing underlying inequalities in opportunities by gaining
political weight in national and regional politics.

71. MICHELLE ACUTO, GLOBAL CITIES, GOVERNANCE AND DIPLOMACY: THE
URBAN LINK 96–97 (2012) (noting “global cities” are “at the heart of today’s world
affairs” and “play a key role in changing some of [international politics’] essential
parameters”); see also HERRSCHEL & NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 1–2 (describing
how cities are becoming “actors in their own right . . . in international policy-making
and governance”).
72. See, e.g., Allan D. Wallis, Regions in Action: Crafting Regional Governance
Under the Challenge of Global Competitiveness, 85 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 15, 17 (1996)
(citing a survey of a dozen regions whose “governments are actively working” toward
“modernization” and “convert[ing] their cities into beacons, leading their nations”).
73. GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER: PLACING SCALE, 1–14 (Andrew Herod & Melissa
W. Wright eds., 2002). See also About Eurocities, EUROCITIES,
http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/about [https://perma.cc/336R-YST7]. In 1986, six
cities set up the Eurocities network, but now over 130 members (plus forty partner
cities) are part of the network. HERRSCHEL & NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 84. These
cities cite “an explicit mission to achieve formal roles in the EU’s ‘multi-level’ policy
processes.” Id.
74. See Michael Keating, Regions and International Affairs: Motives,
Opportunities and Strategies, 9 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 1, 13 (1999) (citing
examples of “practical problems . . . in efforts to secure inter-regional collaboration”
in Canada, France, Spain, and Belgium); see also KEATING, supra note 29, at 16. Cf.
MacLeod & Goodwin, supra note 22, at 511 (“[In] integrated policy communities . . .
individual departments pursue their own autonomy, albeit within overall
governmental constraints.”).
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Thus, unevenness becomes de facto an accepted reality, where
shadow effects of such urban-centric individualism may mean a
marginalization of non-urban and non-participating actors — places,
territories, institutions, organizations, or individuals. Their voices
may become obscured, even drowned out, by the urban nodes of
connectivity and growing political and economic pre-eminence
coupled to their global economic success. 75 The cities and their
economic engagement have thus been leading to the recalibration of
the respective communal space, a reflection of the delicate balancing
act between competitive standing and being an integral part of the
state territory.
Neo-liberalism has grown as a dominant doctrine in economic
policy since the late 1980s. The end of the bi-polar world gave added
impetus to acceptance of individualist competitiveness as the “only
show in town.” Even stalwarts of state intervention in economic
development to counteract structural inequalities, such as the EU,
have succumbed to the neo-liberal rationale. The result has been a
general acceptance of inequality as a matter of fact, and the belief
that success can only be achieved by sending out the strongest players
to globalized capitalism: the already successful cities and city regions.
B.

Cities and Governing the Complexity of Space with Territory

This section explores the possible roles cities and metropolitan
areas may adopt in using their key positions as linchpins of both
virtual collaborative network spaces and the state territories of which
they are an integral part.
Metropolitan areas are, thus, in a crucial position to develop
governance mechanisms that address the gap between
competitiveness-defined spaces and cohesive state territories.
Governing virtual or “soft” spaces, 76 such as network-defined spaces,
is likely to resemble a complex patchwork of negotiated and
renegotiated compromise arrangements among a group of actors selfselecting around a shared agenda. The outcome is a complex,
continuously revised and rearranged self-organizing web of
opportunistic inter-relations and connections, as reflected in the

75. See Castells, supra note 14, at 2743–44.
76. Cormac Walsh, Rethinking the Spatiality of Spatial Planning: Methodological
Territorialism and Metageographies, 22 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 306, 308, 309, 322 (2014)
(drawing distinction between “hard spaces” that refer to “existing institutional
geographies” and “soft spaces” that refer to “relational understanding of place and
space”).
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concept of governance — in contrast to conventional, state actorcentric government.
The concept of governance provides the opportunity to look at
networks from both a political-administrative perspective 77 and the
angle of traditional state hierarchical organization. 78 Their respective
geographic expressions follow the dichotomy between spatially
variable and institutionally “light” networks on the one hand, and the
vertically organized, nested territorial state on the other. 79 The reach
of such interest-defined, and thus actor-selective, networks vaguely
defines the boundaries of such variable, virtual space. 80
This contrast becomes evident in public planning as a main
instrument of the state’s intervention for the collective interest:
Communicative planning 81 adds a new, dynamic, time-dependent, and
geographically “soft” 82 component to traditional planning with its
longer-term, territorially fixed, and prescriptive nature. Rather than
being bureaucratically prescriptive, the focus is on consensus-based
strategy making. 83 And this, at least in principle, offers access to, and
participation in, a broader coalition of interests and voices than

77. R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Ten Years On, 28 ORG. STUD.
1243, 1246 (2007); see generally JONATHAN S. DAVIES, CHALLENGING GOVERNANCE
THEORY: FROM NETWORKS TO HEGEMONY (2011).
78. Compare Ian Bache & Matthew Flinders, Multi-Level Governance and the
Study of the British State, 19 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 31, 33–34 (2004) (juxtaposing the
traditional Westminster model of government with multi-level government) with
Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration:
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, 39 BRIT. J POL. SCI. 1, 2–3
(2009) (advocating post-functionalist, multi-level view of governance, given trend
toward regional integration).
79. Neil Brenner, Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial
Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales, 16 ENV’T & PLAN. D
459, 466 (1998).
80. Tassilo Herrschel, Network Regionalism, Development Agencies and
Peripheralisation Through ‘Loss of Voice,’ in MOVING TOWARDS POSTREGIONALISM? 172–86 (Nicola Bellini et al. eds., 2012); Tassilo Herrschel,
Regionalisation and Marginalisation: Bridging Old and New Regional Divides, in
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN EUROPE: PERIPHERALITY, MARGINALITY
AND BORDER ISSUES 38 (Mike Danson & Peter de Souza eds., 2012).
81. Patsy Healey, Relational Complexity and Imaginative Power of Strategic
Spatial Planning, 14 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 525, 542–43 (2006); see, e.g., Phil
Allmendinger & Graham Haughton, Soft Spaces, Fuzzy Boundaries, and
Metagovernance: The New Spatial Planning in the Thames Gateway, 41 ENV’T &
PLANNING A 617, 618–19 (2009) (describing “relational geography of planning”
employed for the Thames Gateway).
82. See Walsh, supra note 76, at 306–08.
83. See Jesse Heley, Soft Spaces, Fuzzy Boundaries and Spatial Governance in
Post-Devolution Wales, 37 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1325, 1327–28 (2012).
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conventional
institutional
procedures
through
hierarchical
arrangements.
Such opening up raises questions about the form of interrelationships 84 between these two principles of geographic
organization — structure and fluidity. In an ideal scenario, both
geographies may be congruent, producing a near-perfect match
between
like-minded
and
like-interested
self-organizing
“togetherness,” and an a priori prescribed territorial organization of
power, responsibility, and representative democratic legitimacy. In
most cases, however, this congruence between the two layers is less
than perfect, showing an only partial, or fragmented, match. Being
part of a state territorial unit does not automatically mean
participating in decision-making and policy-influencing networks.
This inherent selectivity matters, given the growing economic
relevance and political reality of the network spaces formed for
enhanced competitive prospects under globalization. The result is
growing tensions between the territorially-based possibility to express
political choices (e.g., through elections) that are then translated into
public policy decisions, and the economic reality of highly selective,
increasingly metropolitan-centric, investment decisions in a neoliberal, competitive setting.
Because of these tensions, any public policy outcomes that are
ultimately achieved may not be recognizable in formally and publicly
visible ways. Here, the current “anti-elite” populism finds its raison
d’être: a growing sense of disempowerment or remoteness from
actual decision-making processes that begets a sense of lost voice. 85
The main clusters of influential decision-making networks inevitably
remain concentrated in the metropolitan areas; therefore, democratic
principles and choices may seem, to those on the fringes, less relevant
for the shaping of actual decision-making processes and the
distribution of economic opportunities.
State territories are thus no longer able to provide a consistent and
continuous reference point of certainty. The borders and territories
they define give way to diffuse, virtual spaces of competitive
opportunity which are inherently open, held together by temporary
coordination of shared interest rather than formalized alliances and

84. See infra Sections II.C, II.E; see Flint et al., supra note 45, at 829–30
(discussing “multiple geographies” of “relative physical location” and “positions with
networks of relationships”).
85. Eva Sørensen, Democratic Theory and Network Governance, 24 ADMIN.
THEORY & PRAXIS 693, 698 (2002).
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programs. 86 The underlying driver is, in essence, individual (local,
regional national and personal) self-interest, rather than an
appreciation of the bigger picture. In other words, relations among
actors are primarily driven by the perceived individual benefits for
each of the network members that will result from engagement in
such collaborative arrangements.
Actors may join, leave, or regroup in pursuit of their changing
interests and circumstances, thus producing shifting “geograph[ies] of
centrality and marginality” 87 through reflexive networks. 88 Such
networks consciously adapt to external challenges. The consequence
is a diverse range of new strategic directions for cities and regions,
which emerge from within as they seek to further their priorities and
agendas individually or through collaborative alliances. These clearly
distinguish between those actors that are beneficial for furthering the
network and those that are not. There is no participation by mere
association, such as sharing a fixed, institutionalized territorial entity
of a region or state. No longer is there a general, inclusive safety net
of contiguous territory, when it comes to the pursuit of development
opportunity. Instead, competitiveness and connectedness rely on the
success of individual places. Here, cities and city regions are —
generally — in a better position than the non-metropolitan rest.
And so, less attractive actors, deemed too much of a risk and
ballast for a network, are left to fend for themselves. They may either
remain excluded or need to find other willing partners of similar
limited attraction to boost their equally limited capacity and
opportunities as an alliance of the weak(er). Not being part of such a
“relational web” 89 threatens to reinforce existing relational
peripheralization and marginalization. Such may be read as failure to
make the grade for being considered good enough for inclusion in a
network of enhanced competitiveness and thus opportunity, setting in
train a reinforcing negative momentum.
One solution to this growing selective fragmentation could be to
ensure that all state territories are captured by the forming of relevant
opportunity spaces, or spaces circumscribed by a group of
opportunity-chasing collaborative actors. Traditionally, this has been

86. Paul Kantor, Varieties of City Regionalism and the Quest for Political
Cooperation: A Comparative Perspective, 1 URB. RES. & PRAC. 111, 114 (2008).
87. Sassen, supra note 69, at 212.
88. See Ash Amin & Nigel Thrift, What’s Left? Just the Future, 37 ANTIPODE
220, 228–31 (2005).
89. Patsy Healey, Institutionalist Analysis, Communicative Planning, and Shaping
Places, 19 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 111, 113–15 (1999).
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attempted through active state intervention, such as infrastructure
investment to raise the competitiveness of the more peripheral
areas. 90 This occurs within metropolitan areas, with marginalized
neighborhoods and suburbs, or outside cities, with semi-urban and
rural areas away from the main city regions.
By contrast, another way may be a less expensive, discursive, or
“imagineered” 91 production of cohesiveness, which may serve
primarily more superficial and immediate political agendas. Yet, the
state needs to be willing to take on a more active role in shaping its
territorial development based on politically and democratically
agreed agendas. This deviates from the neo-liberal mantra of the
minimal state being the most economically effective. Some form of
dirigisme may well enhance competitiveness by broadening the range
of potentially successful actors or places. The result may be greater
variety, innovativeness, and dynamic than a mere pursuit of the
survival of the fittest. The subsequent costs may well exceed the
seeming initial benefits.
C.

Collaborative Governance as Undermining of Practical
Democracy

Governance as a concept evolved out of the growing diffusion of
power structures and decision-making since the rise of competitive
globalism with its neo-liberal underpinning. 92 R.A.W. Rhodes,
Professor of Government at the University of Southampton, describes
governance as characterized by variable institutional and territorial
boundaries, goal-defined actor networks, and a degree of autonomy
from the state, all of which point to the inherent “fuzziness” 93 of the
concept. 94 Important here is the specified autonomy of the state.
This push for governing independence points to the growing gap
90. Tassilo Herrschel, Local Policy Restructuring: A Comparative Assessment of
Policy Responses in England and Germany, 27 AREA 228, 231 (1995).
91. See, e.g., Brenda S. A. Yeoh, The Global Cultural City? Spatial Imagineering
and Politics in the (Multi)cultural Marketplaces of South-east Asia, 42 URB. STUD.

945, 946–48 (2005) (discussing how Southeast Asian cities like Singapore
“imagineered” its city into an “economic powerhouse and international business
hub”).
92. R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44
POL. STUD. 652, 653–54 (1996).
93. Ann Markusen, Fuzzy Concepts, Scanty Evidence, Policy Distance: The Case
for Rigour and Policy Relevance in Critical Regional Studies, 37 REGIONAL STUD.
701, 702 (1999) (defining a “fuzzy concept” as “one which posits an entity,
phenomenon or process which possesses two or more alternative meanings and thus
cannot be reliably identified or applied”).
94. Rhodes, supra note 92, at 660.
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between the institutionalized state and actual decision-making
structures and processes. For a democratic state, it is the gap between
representational popular legitimacy derived from the citizenry of all
its territory, and the degree to which these interests are translated
into political processes and developments, that at least questions
comparable opportunities across its owned territory.
It is this growing gap that reflects a “redefined basis of
This, in turn, causes frustration and raises
accountability.” 95
questions about the quality of democratic representation and the
balance between individual, elite, and general civic interests. Indeed,
some theorists of democracy critique neo-liberally characterized
democracies as “defective,” 96 “post-representative,” 97 postdemocratic, 98 or mere façades. 99 It is a claim used by the antidemocratic populists who accuse democratic systems of being no
more than establishment or elite projects. 100
The focus of critique rests in the role of civil society in shaping
political choices: Who calls the shots? It is here that transition theory,
with its focus on democratization, makes the main distinction
between a formal democracy—institutionally democratic on paper
only — and a practiced, actually existing democracy, which involves
popular interest representation in political power. 101
The ways in which collaborative government comes about
determine its degree of openness for interest representation (i.e.
autonomy from the state). Collaborative arrangements organized
top-down via governmental fiat are more state-centric and formally
incorporated into state administrative hierarchies — effectively part
of the state machinery and its institutionalized procedures. By
contrast, collaborations shaped bottom up, through self-organizing

95. Zadek, supra note 39, at 387.
96. See generally Wolfgang Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies, 11
DEMOCRATIZATION 33 (2004).
97. See generally Laura Boldvai-Pethes, 7 CORVINUS J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 131
(2016) (reviewing SIMON TORMEY, THE END OF REPRESENTATIVE POLITICS (2015)).
98. COLIN CROUCH, POST-DEMOCRACY 19–30 (2004).
99. See generally WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME (2014).
100. See generally Howard Davis & Mike Geddes, Deepening Democracy or Élite
Governance? New Political Management Arrangements in Local Government, 20
PUB. MONEY & MGMT. 15 (2000); William Brett, What’s an Elite to Do? The Threat
of Populism from Left, Right and Center, 84 POL. Q. 410 (2013).
101. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND
DEMOCRACY (1997).
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mechanisms either among neighboring municipalities, 102 or between
like-interested metropolises of similar standing and appeal —such as
the mentioned world cities — are deliberate attempts to break out of
the confines of their state contexts. 103 It is a step to boost the own
positions vis-à-vis the state and thus an attempt to gain more
autonomy from it. Globalization and derived pressures for increased
economic competitiveness are the main drivers behind such
collaboration. 104
This greater autonomy from state governing structures affects, for
instance, the range of actors considered eligible for participation in
political processes and the ultimate purpose of collaborative efforts.
Such efforts may aim to merely gain efficiencies in service delivery
and administration, as under new public management. 105 Or, they
may seek to broaden civic involvement by widening the range of
involved governmental and non-governmental, public and private,
actors with their diverse agendas. Though balancing interests
becomes more complex and challenging, this strengthens the
legitimacy and acceptance of political decisions and policy
implementation. Consequently, it becomes more difficult to devalue
such policies as mere elite projects serving elite interests.
However, willingness and capacity to do so vary, reflecting
particular regional and national circumstances and political cultures
with varying balances between individual and collective interests. It is
here that any striving efforts for more autonomy from the state, to
make political choices to maximize development opportunities, find
their limitations. 106
D. Cities as Elites in Democratic States
Inter-actor relationships, such as between cities, sit within varying
place-specific contexts as external milieu. They are composites of
particular societal values, political agendas, state structures, and
scalar allocations of power, as well as historic experiences and
102. See Alan Harding, Taking City Regions Seriously? Response to Debate on
‘City-Regions: New Geographies of Governance, Democracy and Social
Reproduction’, 31 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 443, 451 (2007).
103. HERRSCHEL & NEWMAN, supra note 20.
104. See Harding, supra note 102, at 451–52; Chris Ansell & Alison Gash,
Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
543, 552 (2007).
105. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice

Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science
Association, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1–2 (1998).
106. See, e.g., Healey, supra note 42.
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political-economic structures. 107
They circumscribe scope and
capacity for, but also interest in, “actorness” which means assuming a
proactive stance in decision-making. 108 For localities, this includes a
willingness to participate in governance at the city-regional level,
though it may also mean building and joining networks. Democratic
action may thus be viewed as doubly embedded: (1) internally, in the
functional arrangements and systemic interdependencies of the
different composite elements of a democratic regime, or (2)
externally, as embedded in the broader preconditions for democracy.
These conditions may be supportive or obstructive. 109 Internal
embeddedness involves the statutory position of municipalities within
the state hierarchy. This, in turn, circumscribes the scope for
independent action, and more generally, perceptions of the expected
role of the state in public policy by the individual citizen. External
embeddedness, meanwhile, involves the processes of globalization,
and the working of global capitalism vis-à-vis the state and its
regulatory capacity.
Negotiating and finding a win-win outcome for all concerned is the
raison d’être of all self-organizing collaborative engagement and
action per se, as likely negative outcomes are a disincentive.
Engagement can be justified as part of a local apolitical program only
if the gain is greater through collaboration than through independent
action. Even if orchestrated by the state, the willingness and
enthusiasm to effect policy outcomes depends on the expected
individual advantage. Pressures to demonstrate added value are
likely to be greater in self-organizing collaborative networks because
there the proposed benefits of engagement are the primary
justification of departing from well-established, familiar structural
procedures. It is this pressure to achieve positive outcomes that is
both a strength and a weakness of informal collaborative action. For
instance, lines of responsibility and legitimation of action under an
informal system are not as clear as they are under a hierarchical,
formalized, and institutionalized system. There is also a danger that
the results justifying the means may lead to decisions later challenged
by those to whom the outcomes seem less clearly beneficial.

107. See generally JÖRG DÜRRSCHMIDT, EVERYDAY LIVES IN THE GLOBAL CITY:
THE DELINKING OF LOCALE AND MILIEU (2013).
108. See, e.g., Lisanne Groen & Arne Niemann, The European Union at the

Copenhagen Climate Negotiations: A Case of Contested EU Actorness and
Effectiveness, 27 INT’L REL. 308, 308–24 (2013).
109. See Merkel, supra note 96, at 43–48.
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This conflict is referred to as the relationship between the
individual and the commons, and it requires modes of governance
that can reconcile the differing respective perspectives and appraisals
Applied here, the conflict juxtaposes local
of advantage. 110
individuality in the form of municipal self-governance, with a cityregional common made up of neighboring municipalities. This
common city region is linked to the local individual through expected
advantages for the participating individual municipalities from
collective action. Such individuality refers not just to locality as a
whole, but also institutional, organizational, or personal interests and
considerations, as they consider the costs and benefits of collaborative
action. 111 For example, municipalities may pursue a regional agenda
as part of a strategic move to promote their individual local interests
through collective action, rather than simply scale up such activities to
the regional level as a separate tier of framing and legitimizing
policies. This would be seen as a transfer of power and responsibility,
and thus a local loss of policy-making capacity.
Giving the region an economic value in its own right involves
considering the commonality of interests among the collaborators so
that there is a sense of natural shared purpose and, in return,
individually beneficial outcomes of their collective action. 112
Urbanization and its relevance to state-territorial referencing of
democratic concepts 113 reveal a gap between urban theory, on the one
hand, and theory of democracy and democratization, on the other. 114
Critical and radical urban theory focuses on the link between the city,
as an expression of collective functionality, and the individual. 115 In
so doing, it focuses on the consideration of collective interests 116 and
accessibility of urban spaces, as a matter of spatial justice. 117 The city

110.
111.
112.
113.

See Ostrom, supra note 105, at 17.
See generally Zadek, supra note 39.
See Ostrom, supra note 105, at 10.
See, e.g., SCOTT L. GREER, TERRITORY, DEMOCRACY

AND JUSTICE:
FEDERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (2005).
114. See Clive Barnett, What Do Cities Have to Do with Democracy?, 38.5 INT’L J.
URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1625, 1625 (2014).
115. See generally HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION (Robert Bononno
trans., 2003); HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE
IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 11–24 (1964); see also Neil Brenner,
What Is Critical Urban Theory? 13 CITY 198, 198 (2009).
116. See Susan S. Fainstein, The Just City, 18 INT’L J. URB. SCI. 1, 1–18 (2014); see
also MARCUSE ET AL., SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CITY: DEBATES IN URBAN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2011).
117. See Edward W. Soja, The City and Spatial Justice, JUST. SPATIALE/SPATIAL
JUST., Sept. 2009, at 2, 3.
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is thus construed as an arena in which social structures are manifested
and acted out for influence on, and participation in, city life. 118 It is
thus a distinct social and societal focus, which has repeatedly followed
Marxist analyses and borrowed from structural theory. 119 This theory
focuses in particular on a critique of neo-liberalism as dominant
discourse and the uneven outcomes it produces for citizens within and
outside of cities. And this, in turn raises fundamental questions
around accountability and justice of relevant policy decisions. 120
Democratic theory focuses on questions of representation, the role
of the demos in shaping and controlling power, 121 and neo-liberal
economics as part of the Western model of liberal market democracy,
with its expected natural production of social justice across spatial
scales through trickle down. 122 This theoretical map can be applied to
the relationship between individual localities —be they urban or not
— and state territories as an expression of the collective sum of all
places in a state.
Critical democratic theory addresses the distinction between city
and state political geographies by pointing to the differences in
representative and communicative democracy, respectively. 123 In the
latter, connectivity, and thus access to institutions, power, and
influence, matters. 124 In other words, the normative notions of
legitimacy are of primary interest, based on universal representation
versus selective engagement as a means for gaining greater political
efficacy. The question is how theoretical and actually experienced
expressions of democracy are negotiated and become anchored to
particular structures and histories.

118. See generally David Harvey, The Right to the City, 53 NEW LEFT REV. 23
(2008); see also CITIES FOR PEOPLE, NOT FOR PROFIT: CRITICAL URBAN THEORY AND
THE RIGHT TO THE CITY (Neil Brenner et al. eds., 2011).
119. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 118.
120. See, e.g., Clive Barnett, Situating the Geographies of Injustice in Democratic
Theory, 43 GEOFORUM 677 (2012).
121. See Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 307, 314 (2003).
122. See Marlies Glasius & Geoffrey Pleyers, The Global Moment of 2011:
Democracy, Social Justice and Dignity, 44 DEV. & CHANGE 547, 549 (2013); see also
Brian J. L. Berry, David Harvey: Social Justice and the City, 6 ANTIPODE 142, 145–49
(1974).
123. See Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in
Contemporary Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387, 387–412 (2008); see
also DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman
& William Rehg eds., 1997).
124. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
THEORY 1, 13 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2006).
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For democratic engagement, identity and sense of belonging are
important factors in pinpointing the relevant territorial reference, be
it the nation-state or a region or city with distinct identities. For
instance, collaborative regionalism draws on municipal entities which,
as building blocks of the democratic state, are also important
demos
democratic
spaces
of
and legitimacy of political processes, such as local elections and
councils. Municipal entities, in pursuit of their specific local agendas,
provide the basis for more varied, detailed and individually
responsive policies. This greater variety in policy responses and
strategies takes into account an increasingly detailed variety in
circumstances, potentials, and interests of places than is possible at
the more aggregate conventional territorial approach with a more
uniform policy implementation down the political hierarchy.
Likewise, further up the spatial scale, inherently elitist
cosmopolitanism faces pressures for recognizing, and responding to,
transnational justice in income and opportunity, and needs to adjust
in imaginative, individualized ways to meet criticism. 125
Importantly, cities and metropolitan areas have gained twofold:
first, as competitive economic and political actors, and second, as
platforms for, and expressions of, democratic representation. This
has added complexity to the democratic state, as it highlights, and
offers the opportunity to articulate, differing interests, perspectives,
and priorities within the territory-based democracy of states and
regions. This, in turn, challenges notions of a territorial uniformity
and the capacity to formulate democratic response.
E.

Democracy and “Citi-ness”

This section focuses on the need for a more city-shaped form of
democratic policy making. The notion of “citi-ness” seeks to capture
the particular characteristics of city-based societal interests and
political processes. This, re-calibrates the understanding of
democratic principles away from the one-size-fits-all territorial model.
Factors like political historic legacies, experiences, and cultures do
not feature much in the territorial model of the state. Rather, the
state is understood as a territorial black box, with no further
distinctions beyond the overall visibly territorial and institutional
characteristics. 126 There is much less interest in internal territorial

125. See generally Flint et al., supra note 45.
126. See, e.g., John Agnew, Still Trapped in Territory?, 15 GEOPOLITICS 779, 779–
84 (2010).
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variations, such as differences between urban and non-urban spaces
in experiencing and shaping democracy. Does the difference between
“urban” and “non-urban” matter? In urban critical theory, the city is
the primary lens as a given spatial platform, on which different
interests and power structures in society manifest themselves
physically.
In urban theory, the city is a given as the primary focus of interest.
Consequently, there is much less discussion about the possible
functioning of such theory in a non-urban setting. This suggests an
automatic implicit assumption that it is the urban places that
matter. 127 Cities are the particular and relevant political arenas.
Meanwhile, in democratic theory, “citi-ness” 128 plays little role as a
particular factor. “The state” as a concept does not know such
distinction. It is therefore difficult for either analysis to address the
intricacies between metropolitanization, where cities are favored
objects by post-structuralist theories of globalization, and debates on
democratic principles, where the state is primarily an institutional
entity with a uniform territorial expression.
Yet the spatial dimension matters too, as it creates different
layered identities and begets the perception that there are differing
degrees of “affectedness” by certain political issues. 129 “Affectedness”
thus means being affected by the processes and policy decisions of
others, and thus is inherently about passivism. What is the scope to
turn this passivism into agency, formulate a response, and thus shape
the ways in which affectedness works? The greater the gap between
passive and active, the greater the sense of political impotence and
being a mere leaf in the wind of wider processes.
This sense of being reduced to a mere passive role has resulted in
the current boost to populist nationalism and inward-looking politics
which we can observe in Europe and the U.S. 130 This fundamentally
contradicts the role and nature of democratic principles and thus
corrodes democratic values. The retreat of this political faction into
itself has been borne of the distinction between “metropolitanism”
and “the rest,” with the associated values of left-leaning,
internationalist, and diverse in the former, and conservative, often

127. See, e.g., Kuniko Fujita, Introduction to CITIES AND CRISIS: NEW CRITICAL
URBAN THEORY 26 (Kuniko Fujita ed., 2013).
128. Jeff Coulter, Human Practices and the Observability of the ‘Macrosocial’, 25
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE 377, 340 (1996).
129. See Barnett, supra note 114, at 1631.
130. See, e.g., Left in the Lurch, supra note 7.
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inward-looking in the latter with a penchant for authoritarian
leadership as benevolent ‘father’ of the whole nation.
Networks are about power games, 131 generally focused around
specific, single objectives (“issue networks”). 132 They include a
growing localization – or, rather, metropolitanization – of the regional
scale of governance. 133 And this results in an effective, albeit
administratively invisible, dissection of the territorially fixed entity
‘region’ into temporary, policy-driven, local groupings, where
regionalization is a merely incidental outcome of inter-local
collaboration. The result has been a dynamization of territory
towards a continuously changing patchwork of relationally-defined
and opportunity-driven policy spaces. 134 The nature of these spaces
thus effectively has added a perception of a geography that sits next
to a conventional understanding of hierarchical state territoriality and
its organizational principles.
Underneath these virtual, relationally-defined, geographic entities
lie established governmental territories with clearly defined and
institutionally-backed powers, fiscal and statutory responsibilities,
and democratic legitimacies.
It is through these established
governmental territories that inherently self-selective network spaces
can become effective on the ground: by being “anchored” to existing
structures. 135 And these most salient anchor points are more likely to
take hold in cities than the functionally less connected and influential
“rest” of a territory. How this “anchoring” can work in practice
varies depending on each city’s particular circumstances 136, thus
circumscribing their capacity to negotiate, their tensions, and their
contestations. The example presented here illustrates this complex
relationship between, fixed and democratically legitimating stateadministrative territoriality and, selective, often invisible, networkdefined and virtual spatiality. The conventional, administrative
Region Skåne in southern Sweden exemplifies the former, the

131. See Annika Agger & Karl Lofgren, Democratic Assessment of Collaborative
Planning Processes, 7 PLAN. THEORY 145, 145–64 (2008).
132. See GRAHAME F. THOMPSON, BETWEEN HIERARCHIES AND MARKETS: THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF NETWORK FORMS OF ORGANIZATION 126–38 (2003).
133. See generally TASSILO HERRSCHEL & YONN DIERWECHTER, DISCUSSIONS
ABOUT CITY-REGIONALISM (2018); see also JOHN HARRISON & MICHAEL HOYLER,
MEGAREGIONS: GLOBALIZATION’S NEW URBAN FORM? 5–11 (John Harrison &
Michael Hoyle eds., 2015).
134. See generally HERRSCHEL, supra note 24.
135. See generally Flint et al., supra note 45.
136. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, STRUCTURES, HABITUS, PRACTICES (1990).
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Øresund Region (now rebranded as Greater Copenhagen and Skåne)
illustrates the latter.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL ØRESUND REGION: METROPOLITANDEFINED SPACE INTERSECTS WITH STATE-DEFINED TERRITORY

Region Skåne in southern Sweden (Figure 1) remains a fascinating
example of multiple regionalisms overlapping and intersecting – those
that are territorially fixed, equitable in terms of democratic
representation, and institutionalized as part of the hierarchical state,
and those that are projected as more or less virtual, discursive spaces
underpinning self-organizing urban networks in the pursuit of specific
shared interests. The beginning of constructing discursively the
Øresund Region was the opening of the fixed link Øresund Bridge in
2000, which fundamentallychanged the relational dynamics in the
Danish-Swedish regional space. 137

137. The
Oresund
Bridge,
ORESUNDBRON
(Aug.
31,
https://www.oresundsbron.com/en/node/6738 [https://perma.cc/LH9K-C53G].
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Figure 1: Øresund Region: Selective Metropolitanization and
Exclusion of the “Rest Region” of Skåne
Study Area

Landskrona

Source: Based on a prior version of an outline map by Lund
University. All contents added by the author.

Until the bridge opening, economically, the border had been
somewhat “like an Iron Curtain.” 138 The opening has become the
main driver of changing spatial relationships – whether experienced,
advocated, or perceived. Two relationships interact: (1) regions as
cohesive territorial parts of the hierarchically-ordered state, defined
by clear boundaries, including the physical separation by the Øresund
Strait along the international border between Sweden and Denmark;
and (2) regions as a fragmented, non-contiguous outcome of selective,
self-organizing, inter-municipal collaboration, with a distinct
metropolitan or urban focus. The latter type region aims to boost
international visibility to attract presumed footloose global capital by
emphasizing the advantages that stem from complementarity of
location factors in the two countries.
Section III.A looks at the Øresund Region as a constructed space
based around expected increased competitive opportunities. Section
III.B discusses the growing division between the central role of the
138. Interview with Official, Øresund Committee, in Øresund (Nov. 19, 2003)
(unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author).
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main grouping of cities and the marginalising effect of this for the rest
of the wider geographic region of Skåne. Section III.C discusses the
crucial role of cities as potential connectors between variable and
essentially elitist collaborative spaces of competition within the
territorial collectivity of the democratic state. It is this second role
that is only beginning to be identified as part of the growing questions
about the relationship between globalized capitalism and principles of
egalitarian representation in a democratic state. And it is around this
that the current discussions about the Øresund Region between
Region Skåne and Greater Copenhagen have essentially revolved.
The inherent conundrum has not quite been solved yet, as the rather
cumbersome, bolted-together name ‘Greater Copenhagen and
Region Skåne’ suggests.
A. The Øresund Region as Technologically Enabled and
Economically Driven International Opportunity Space
The Øresund Region as a discursive marketing project has been
substantially shaped by its main cities in both Denmark and Sweden,
facing each other across the sea. Conventional regionalism, such as
sub-national state territories, is represented through the formalized
Capital City Region (Hovedstaden) in Denmark and Region Skåne in
Sweden. In Sweden, like all Swedish regions, Region Skåne’s main
task is the distribution of public services, especially health care.139
Since 2010, Skåne, as a pilot project of limited regional devolution,
gained some greater degree of autonomy, including economic
development, as test cases for devolving responsibilities to the
regional level. 140
The region remains a creature of the central state. Most of its cities
are concentrated along the western coastline, 141 with the rest being
characterized by expansive rural areas with a scattering of villages
and a few small market towns. Skåne thus shows a clear functional
geographic division between an urban western coast and a largely
rural rest. This contrast has been brought to the fore by the public

139. See The Swedish Model of Government Administration, GOVERNMENT
OFFICES OF SWEDEN, https://www.government.se/how-sweden-is-governed/theswedish-model-of-government-administration/ [https://perma.cc/VL26-QR6L]; see
also Health Care in Sweden, SWEDISH INSTIT., https://sweden.se/society/health-carein-sweden/ [https://perma.cc/6WKG-YKJY].
140. See Regional Development, SVERIGES KOMMUNEROCH LANDSTING,
https://skl.se/tjanster/englishpages/municipalitiescountycouncilsandregions/regionald
evelopment.1304.html [https://perma.cc/C2NQDQS4].
141. See Figure 1.
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and political discussion around the Øresund Region as a political and
economic spatial construct. 142 The result was a perceived, even if
formally invisible, separation into those municipalities that
considered themselves part of this new discursive space of
internationality and competitiveness, and those that quite clearly feel
not part of this new space. 143 This has resulted in the latter’s further
sense of marginalization and peripheralization and loss of voice. A
sense of political unease and even frustration followed with the
seemingly de facto division between first and second-class
municipalities within Skåne, when it comes to having a voice in
shaping regional matters.
The concept of the discursive Øresund region as a spatial image
follows the rationale of network-based, relationally defined “new”
regions— essentially opportunistic, based on a shared agenda, and
collaborative for a select group of actors whose participation defines
the spatial extent of the region. Globalization, and the growing focus
on competitiveness by the EU in the 2000s, have been key drivers of
this development. 144 The geographically neutral, non-descript name
of the concept region is per se an expression of the underlying rivalry
between the main cities, especially the largest three, Copenhagen,
Malmö and Lund. And then there are national sensitivities on the
Swedish side, mainly in Stockholm and outside the Skåne Region,
towards being ‘subsumed’ under the name of Greater Copenhagen,
the capital of Denmark. 145 Against this, there has been a recent
remarkable complete volte-face, that reflects shifting political
interests vis-à-vis rapidly changing economic realities. In 2016,
following pressure from Copenhagen to have a stronger visibility of

142. See Interview, Official, Region Skåne Administration, in Region Skåne (Jan.
10, 2013) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author);
Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, in Lund Town Hall, City of Lund
(Dec. 12, 2013) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with
author).
143. See Interview with Official, Ystad, Southeast Skåne Region Organization, in
Southeast Skåne Region (May 20, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to preserve
anonymity) (notes on file with author). For a more general discussion of
international political spaces, see, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL
SPACES AND BORDER CROSSINGS 15–16 (James Anderson ed., 2002).
144. See Interview with Official, Øresund Committee, supra note 138.
145. These sensitivities go back to the times when Skåne was Danish until about
300 years ago, as was repeatedly pointed out in interviews. See id.; see, e.g., Interview
with Official, Øresund Committee, supra note 138.
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its name to boost international recognition, the name of the Øresund
Region was changed to “Greater Copenhagen and Skåne.” 146
This reflects the outcome of a general disillusionment on the
Danish side – mainly in Copenhagen – with the lukewarm support for
further collaboration in Sweden, and a greater emphasis on
traditional state-sponsored regionalism. One of the reasons has been
a distrust of Stockholm, some 500 kilometers away, in favor of a close
relationship with Denmark and a growing economic integration of a
Swedish peripheral part (as seen from the capital) with an economic
corridor reaching from Oslo, via Gothenburg, to Hamburg. 147 Within
the Øresund region, dealing with Copenhagen at a local level is no
problem at all, whereas a bit further away Copenhagen is viewed
primarily as a foreign capital. 148
But also at a more regional level, political temperature has varied
between Copenhagen’s and Malmö’s city leadership in the early
2010s, 149 when a change in Copenhagen’s mayoralty meant a more
sceptical view of the likely benefits of engaging with the eastern
neighbor. 150 Copenhagen’s interest focused on the urban centres,
especially Malmö as the largest and most accessible city on the
Swedish side, and there is a strong duopoly of interests, including
plans for an undersea metro line. 151 Through this closer cooperation,
the two cities have practically left the rest even of the Øresund region
behind, manifesting a threefold core-periphery order: (1) the MalmöCopenhagen duopoly, (2) followed by the virtual Øresund Region,
and (3) the rest of Region Skåne.
The re-projecting and re-branding of the Øresund Region as
Greater Copenhagen and Skåne is an attempt to respond to
Copenhagen’s pressure to have its leading – and internationally more
visible – position recognized more clearly. But there is also Skåne’s

146. See Interview with City Official, Mayor’s Office, in City of Helsingborg (Apr.
19, 2018) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author).
147. See id.; see also Interview, City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region Skåne
Administration, in City of Malmö (May 21, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to preserve
anonymity) (notes on file with author).
148. See Interview with City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region Skåne
Administration, supra note 147.
149. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142; see
Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142.
150. See Interview with City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region Skåne
Administration, supra note 147.
151. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142; Interview
with City Official, in City of Landskrona (May 19, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to
preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author).

2018]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1233

political push evident in the addition to the name “and Skåne,” as the
region wants to be acknowledged as the “true” (i.e. formalized)
regional representation for all municipalities within its territory. 152
Yet, it does not change the dominance of the further strengthened
duopoly Copenhagen-Malmö, which further exacerbates the
underlying unease about uneven regional voice between Malmö and
the smaller municipalities and thus actual and perceived asymmetries
in power and influence. The smaller places are concerned about their
scope for self-determination as the main cities gain agency. 153
The main attraction has been an extension of its hinterland for
wider (and lower-cost) housing choices for Copenhagen residents, an
increased consumer demand, and an enhanced employment pool in
an international climate. 154 The Øresund region conceptually has
been convincing on its rationale. But differences in taxation and
currency, both national responsibilities, demonstrate the continued
presence of the territorial state and imperfect anchoring between it
and the Øresund space. 155 Global economic changes, such as in 2008,
which reduced the economic advantages of this collaboration quite
significantly, simultaneously highlighted the importance of a win-win
outcome for continued support for this form of a political-economic
project. 156
The particular metropolitan interests in the Øresund Region are
the drivers and oxygen of this regionalization project, and these are,
in essence, selectively elitist, rather than representatively egalitarian
for all municipalities. 157 Even if located within the virtual boundary
of the Øresund Region (or, since 2016), Greater Copenhagen and
Skåne, involvement with the relevant policy network is not a given.
And the different experiences of the winners and losers of this project
are likely to create political differences in priorities and more support
for conventional regionalism as a sign of collective state support, as
152. For instance, the somewhat provocatively titled “Denmark Wants to ReBrand Parts of Sweden as Greater Copenhagen.” See David Crouch, Denmark
Wants to Re-Brand Parts of Sweden as Greater Copenhagen, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/denmark-wants-to-rebrandpart-of-sweden-as-greater-copenhagen [https://perma.cc/2ANG-9J5W].
153. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142.
154. See Interview with Official, Øresund Committee, supra note 138.
155. See, e.g., id.; see also Interview with City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region
Skåne Administration, supra note 147.
156. See id.; see Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note
142; see also Claire Nauwelaers et al., The Case of Oresund (Denmark-Sweden)—
Regions and Innovation: Collaborating Across Borders, 21 OECD Regional
Development Working Papers (2013).
157. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142.
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advantages from the Øresund region are felt much more indirectly in
the Skåne periphery. 158 It is for that reason that the city of
Helsingborg, a larger player in the Øresund Region, and part of the
‘urban elite,’ tries to act as interlocutor for its surrounding
municipalities by having prompted the “Helsingborg Family” as a
group of neighboring municipalities. 159 This is to initiate the trickledown effect that neo-liberal enthusiasts claim makes more
individualized competitiveness promising and justified. 160
Elsewhere, towns like Ystad on the southern coast, which consider
themselves outside the imagined and functional Øresund region, 161
seek other possibilities to step out of the regional shadow and be
more visible on their own through emphasis of individuality and thus
a de facto rise above the more peripheral rural surroundings.162
Participating in EU projects, even if they are about region-specific
food as the main focus, serve as platform for internationalization as
way out of peripherality in the shadow of the Øresund Region.
Another form of local self-empowerment in a peripheral setting
involves collaborative action among like-positioned municipalities.
Such sub-regional networks subdivide Skåne into four smaller
network-based regions – one in each corner. It is a form of mutual
assurance and support through occasional meetings just to keep in
touch. 163
The Øresund’s competitive success was expected to ultimately
benefit the whole of southern Sweden through improved links to the
economic hub of Northwestern Europe, especially the global port of
Hamburg. 164 More than a decade later, this neo-liberal rationale
turned out differently.
The already less well-connected and
developing eastern, largely rural, part of Region Skåne feels even
more distant and peripheralized, as all attention has turned to Malmö
and the city-region along the western coast. 165

158. See Nauwelaers, supra note 156.
159. See Interview with City Official, Mayor’s Office, supra note 146; see also The
HELSINGBORG,
https://helsingborg.se/kommun-ochFamily
Helsingborg,
politik/samarbete/regionalt/familjen-helsingborg/ [https://perma.cc/TWX9-423D].
160. See Andreou, supra note 12.
161. Interview with Official, Ystad, Southeast Skåne Region Organization, supra
note 143.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142; see
Interview, Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142.
165. Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142; see
Interview, Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142.
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Since its inauguration eighteen years ago, the galvanizing effect of
the Øresund Bridge has given way to a degree of normality, where
activity across the sea no longer is viewed as such an extraordinary
thing. 166 Instead, territorial borders have regained their delimitating
impact on spatial imaginations and narratives. This has been
especially true since the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, which
brought the state back very visibly in the form of border controls at
the bridge. 167 The end of the virtual Øresund University as network
of existing Danish and Swedish universities in the region in 2013168
also points to a cooling of the trans-national idea of the Øresund. It
has lost some of its novelty effect, challenged by more visible and
realized underlying troubles of uneven development and a growing
divide between the successful urban centres and the more struggling
peripheralized rest. 169
Here, it matters that the Øresund region has no “hard” political
dimension of its own, as its governance operated until recently
through the Øresund Committee 170 and, since 2016, the Greater
Copenhagen and Skåne Committee. 171 A regional agenda does not
yield electoral or political bonus points. As such, there is no political
lobbying on its behalf as a spatial entity. Instead, the economically
driven and narrated Øresund region needs to work through the
respective underlying administrative structures and regulations.
Borders, boundaries, and institutional and regulative differences
continue to matter as needed “anchor points,” 172 as do political
considerations of likely electoral rewards. It is for that reason, that
the conventional (Scandinavian) egalitarian, collective perspective
and rationale have come back to be considered as expression of the
democratically underpinned state territory.

166. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142; see also
Interview with City Official, Mayor’s Office, supra note 146.
167. While at Copenhagen’s Kastrup airport, Author observed make-shift detailed
border control at the airport station for trains heading to Sweden, with Swedish
border control positioned at the first station after crossing the Øresund bridge.
168. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142; see
also Nauwelaers et al., supra note 156.
169. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142.
170. See Nauwelaers et al., supra note 156.
171. The Story of Malmö, MALMö STAD, http://Malmö.se/Nice-to-know-aboutMalmö/EU-and-International-Cooperation-/Regional-work/Greater-Copenhagenand-the-Skane-Committee.html [https://perma.cc/ADS7-PTCL].
172. See generally Flint et al., supra note 45, at 827–35.
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B. Urban-Centric Øresund Region, Peripheralization, and
Marginalization
As evident from the Øresund example, peripheralization and
marginalization are not merely the result of geographic distance from
a core, but rather of a communicative, participative distance to
functional networks between policy-making actors and their strategic
alliances. And this distance circumscribes the scope to participate in,
and influence, decision-making and outcomes for oneself. While
infrastructure is important in communication and accessibility,
individual agency in the form of building networks and alliances to
further their own interests are equally as important. Connectivity
matters, be that conventionally communicative or relational alliances
through networks. Some of the “cores” (or nodes) may participate as
actors in different networks for different agendas at the same time,
boosting their presence and voice, and thus agenda.
Networks may be overlapping and overlaying, following variable
geometries of engagement and prioritising. They are also, in turn,
excluding and fragmenting, and thus produce differences in scope for
engagement and participation through articulating a political voice.
There is an invisible, but potentially very effective, line separating
included and excluded localities and territorial parts of formal state
territory, such as defined regions. In the example used here, it is a
distinction between the dynamic, internationally connected urbandefined part “trading” under the banner of the Øresund Region
strategic space, and the rural, less dynamic, more inward-looking and
state-oriented, dependent hinterland to the east as dominant part of
the formal Region Skåne.
The urban-based inequality has been quite a delicate political issue
for some time, 173 but now the issue seems to gain recognition 174 as the
new Skåne Development Plan Open Skåne 2030 tentatively indicates.
But cities have different responses to that, with some, as Malmö,
quite openly following their own interests (“Malmö first”). 175 Others,
such as Helsingborg, are trying to downplay their stronger position
vis-à-vis the surrounding municipalities to minimize tension and allow
co-operation. 176 Malmö and Lund will be the main drivers for the
173. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142.
174. See generally Development Skåne, REGION SKÅNE, https://utveckling.skane.se
[https://perma.cc/42A6-NH9W].
175. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142.
176. See Interview with Helsingborg International Office, in City of Helsingborg
(Dec. 11, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with
author).
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whole area, but the question remains to what extent the two cities
want to be burdened with having to carry the whole region
economically, thus making their own drive for competitiveness and
international success more difficult and less immediately rewarding.
The important political task is to find alternative ways to employ
this conventional approach of merely redistributing economic growth
potential. The economically more successful option may be to
manage, rather than seek to curtail, the different pathways and spatial
orientations of the two parts of the Region. This means going further
with the integration in the Øresund Region to strengthen its
competitive advantages. This may lead to a further move towards a
city region with growing urbanization, while seeking an alternative
connector and development platform for the rest.
C.

Democratic Responsiveness and “Affectedness” in a State Is
Not “One Size Fits All”

There is a growing differentiation of a territorial state as presumed
uniform platform for democratic participation and expressing a
democratic voice. Cities, and especially larger metropolitan areas,
have developed a more explicit and audible political voice in
promoting their interests at state and regional level.
The political theorist Habermas speaks of communicative action177
in relation to the all-affected principle, 178 where everyone within a
demographic (however defined) group, or territory, is subject to the
same pressures, and most importantly, resulting decisions and
responding political processes. This involves the sense of being
represented. How should we respond to the affectedness? Should it
be through democracy from above, being taken care of by those in
power including the nation state, or from below, where smaller units
collaborate and self-organize? This may mean to re-spatialize
democratic imagination, 179 which would include a sense of belonging
and having influence. But does this lead to emancipatory politics
developing around the plurality of identities within cities and also
across metropolitan areas, within broader city regions? Only when

177. J. Habermas, ‘A Reply,’ in COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: ESSAYS ON JÜRGEN
HABERMAS’S THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 214–64 (A. Honneth & H.
Joas eds., 1984).
178. See, e.g., David Owen, Constituting the Polity, Constituting the Demos: On

the Place of the All Affected Interests Principle in Democratic Theory and in
Resolving the Democratic Boundary Problem, 5 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 129, 130–31

(2012).
179. See generally Amin & Thrift, supra note 88, at 220, 226.
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demos and democratic politics approach congruence can the notion of

“all affectedness” and thus “all involved and relevant” be maintained
or achieved.
There is a need to consider place-based democracy and
representation. Different localities or regions, as well as states,
produce particular milieux for evaluating the need for, engagement
with, and expectations from democratic processes and outcomes. This
includes the role of civil society as politicized expression of the
demos. It is here that the sense of satisfaction or disappointment with
democratic structures and outcomes are shaped. This becomes
evident in the different sense of ownership of democratic processes
and resulting politics between Western and post-communist Eastern
Europe, for instance, as the growing support for authoritarian leaders
and restricted political debate and choices suggests.
This global shift, and the populist Right in Western Europe,
presents democracies as playgrounds of the elites, not really
interested in the genuine needs of the people at large. And the fact
that these narratives, as well as the political responses evident in
election results suggest clear metropolitan – non-metropolitan
differences, 180 points to variations that have developed of the purpose
and desirability of representative democracies. 181 Instead, the interest
is in general principles of power relations between people and the
state.
Other important differences in traditions, which shape attitudes
towards democratic procedures and willingness and scope to get
involved, include the position of local governments. How much
genuine decision-making and political autonomy do they possess?
For example, there is a clear difference between federal systems with
forms of multi-level democratic autonomy, such as in federal systems
(e.g., Germany or the U.S.) and centralized systems, where local
government is a creature of higher level parliament (e.g., the UK or
Canada).
Places matter. Urbanization creates new dynamics and new spatial
patterns and relations with associated varying conditions for
democratic contention, negotiation, and inclusion. It is here that
classical Marxist analysis has brought in structuration theory and the
role of uneven affectedness of places (and people) by the effects of

180. See, e.g., Richard Florida, How America’s Metro Areas Voted, CITYLAB
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/11/how-americas-metro-areasvoted/508355/ [https://perma.cc/3DAW-28S5].
181. See, e.g., URBINATI, supra note 30, at 17–59.
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global capitalism. 182 Some places are more likely to benefit than
others and this challenges the notions behind representative
democracy. Furthermore, this inequality becomes more evident as the
promise underlying the neo-liberal market economy model no longer
seems to hold and some places, especially cities, seem to fare much
better than others.
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the link between relationally shaped,
agenda-driven network-defined spaces and conventional, statedefined territoriality. It is the degree of congruence between the two
that circumscribes the scope for marrying the inherent dynamic and
problem-solving nature of collaborative network policy and the more
permanent geography of institutionalized universal legitimation and
implementation of state power.
This Article distinguished between (1) territory as a priori defined
geographic entities within a state hierarchy and a clearly defined
demos, 183 and (2) ad hoc defined spaces of collaboration between
like-interested actors. The former serves as a vehicle for uniform
democratic representation and linking state and the population as a
whole, while the latter is inherently selective, mirroring group-specific
interests and opportunities as they connect and collaborate to seek to
maximise their own opportunity. Collaboration is viewed as a means
to individual ends. The difference is thus the mechanism of inclusion:
by territorial association and opportunistic ‘added value’ respectively.
The two co-exist, as the case study of the Øresund Region illustrates.
Their inter-relationships can be more or less complex, harmonious or
conflictual, as they mirror varying degrees of congruence – or
discrepancy.
The crux of the matter rests in the ability to reconcile seemingly
competing or conflicting or contradicting interests: finding a
reconciling solution, which depends on political leadership and/or
innovativeness in adopted political modi operandi. This may, for
instance, involve the acceptance of the trans-scalar nature of local
engagement, right up to an international representation, rather than
viewing cities merely as integral part of a state. Or, collaborative
action among actors, here cities, is used to enhance individual

182. See, e.g., David Harvey, The Geopolitics of Capitalism, in SOCIAL RELATIONS
128, 128–63 (1985).
183. See, e.g., Sarah Song, The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the
Demos Should Bounded by the State, 4 INT’L THEORY 39, 39–40 (2012).
AND SPATIAL STRUCTURES

1240

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

capacity and prospects of gaining advantage. The challenge is to
reconcile two different, yet concurrent rationales and subsequent
dynamics: confinement to the uniformity of state structure and selforganizing collaborative local individualism to pursue specific
agendas to individual advantage. The crucial question, then, arises
about how such innovative politics can achieve public support on the
basis of established territorial patterns and public views of what
constitutes appropriate representation of their interests. As we could
observe over recent times, merely claiming that some vague general
benefit will result from individual collaborations between leading
actors may not suffice. Rather, notions of collusion among an elite to
further their own advantage may only raise doubts about whose
interests are being served. The choice seems to be between an
unspecified elite running a democratic system to their own advantage,
as populists like to claim, or broad popular engagement with
democratic processes to take collective ownership of the workings
and challenges of a representative democracy.

